phil ethics m
Terms
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Intuitionism - Two Types
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Moral intuitionism-view in ethics, Ross
Rational intuitionism - view in metaethics, Ross and Moore
Separate views - one does not imply the other.
20th C concerned with rational
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Moral intuitionism
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Moral-moral pluralism-plurality of moral first principles and no principle that underlies and justifies them
Ross adds can be conflicts and inelim need exercise jud resolve
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Rational intuititionism
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Basic m concepts r g w not analyz in nonm (pos eachother)
First m p or ps se props about kinds of consid are good grounds for saying x is intrinsic good-se truths about good reasons fixed order ind prior concep scheme, rat intuit
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Rational intuititionism and moral motivation
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basic assump is recognition of first principles as true and se gives rise, in being capable of rat intuit them, a desire act from them for own sake
- Rational intuititionism and compatible moral views
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Sidgwick
Moore's Ideal Utilitarianism-consequ p organic unity is his view extremely pluralistic-few if any useful first ps and cases decided by intuition-good of combination of pleasure, beauty truths known intuition
Ross-reasons given
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Arguments for Rational intuitionism
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Moore's OPA meant to be argument for (1)-basic moral c not analyz terms nonmor
Ross-refl intuition, reached suff matur and special attention to prop, guide in ethics like sense data in nat science-uses OQA against M, right op
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People accused of running afoul of the Naturalistic Fallacy
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Mill defines 'good' as the object of desire
Bentham seems to define 'right' as 'conducive to the greatest happiness' (at least according to Sidgwick, who says princ tells us that actions are cond to GH as they are cond to
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Moore's conclusion about property of goodness
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simple, unanalyzable property knowable by rational intuition
- Moore on definitions
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Unclear whether concepts or properties
Real definitions-describe real nature of object or notion, not with those tell us way certain words commonly taken mean
Possible only when concept or object complex-horse has many properties can be enu
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Frankena - Definist Fallacy
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fallacy of confusing one object with another, defining one by the other
Ex-confusing pleasure and redness - fallacy say one means other
Butler-everything is what it is and not another
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Naturalistic Fallacy
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Confusing one non-natural object with a natural one, defining one by the other
Saying pleasure is good meaningless if good means pleasure.
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Open Question Argument - for claim that 'good' is simple and indefineable
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Complex prop-whatever def, always asked with sign whether good, so two diff not-ex:g=what d to d, but ask 'is it good to d to d x', anal 'do we d d d d x', nothing so complicated
Meaningless-no
Simple
- Ross and OQA
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Moore defines right in terms of good-x is right iff x prod greatest intris value compared available alternatives
Right and optimific are not synonymous so not same concept or prop
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OQA and relation to is/ought problem, fact value - Frankena
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Nothing do NF
Epic, p sought all men, so p good, commit is/ought-add 'what sought all m g', not i/o, but NF?-might be intuition, deduction from pure ethic, but if def then NF
No nec conn-pl and r, no io, g p, mistake is NF
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Hume's point - ought / is
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ought statements cannot be derived from is - ethical conclusions cannot be drawn validly from premises which are non-ethical
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Response to OQA - no interesting analysis
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OQA assumes imposs for concep analysis to be true and interest
A terms B infor, must be poss ask sign whether A thing is B, but OQA assumes only way analy correct is for it not sign ask-corr only if uninfor
Most anal t+i, sign ask color rea
- Response to OQA - synthetic a priori
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2 concept refer same property-water H20
concept good may be indefin, but poss other conce pick same prop and that prop may be simple or complex, nat or nonnat
M meaning in head, satisfy criteria of app satisfies conc-but mean det causal connec -
Response to Open Question Argument - Frankena's response
- assuming open q whether x also good begs question analytical natural-conviction open must be well grounded before justified appealing for purposes arg-but if ethic nat correct, convic not well-founded-saying open concept confu-so appeal to convic only if
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Mackie - Error Theory and his assumptions about mroal judgments and truthmakers
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The view that a belief in objective values is built in to ordinary moral thought and language, but holding that this ingrained belief is false
Cognitivism
m props have sort magneti-intrins action guiding and motivating
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Mackie - argument from relativity
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well-known variation moral code-society period, within socie-seem reflect adherence to different ways life rather than facts-sometimes from factual disa or prejudice
radical differen bt first order ju make difficult treat as app object truths&nbs
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Mackie - response to argument from relativity
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obj not specificrules but general basic princip, implic recog across societies - so applying basic principles
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Mackie - argument from queerness
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If o val, would be entities, qualities relations of strange sort-intrins action guiding, knowable ways different from ordinary, need account how relate nat props-not like anything have good reason believe eixst
Ex-Forms, knowledge intri action gu
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Mackie - epiestimic element - Argument from Queerness
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if aware, have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from ordinary ways of knowing everything else
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Harman's argument - causal theory of knowledge and objectivity
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obj of j depends on suit expl wi causal theory k
j obj iff content of j is (in part) outcome app kind causal process affecting sense experience, say, on which j based
j 'cat on mat' result app caus proc affec exp of cat -
Harman argument - types of beliefs covered
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familiar expl of such exp on which perc j about medium sized phys objects based
Event cog psy fill in story theor j-t phys, j obj bc have expl showing affirmed result approp causal proc related world's being way think
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Responses to Harman - causal req
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Question whether causal req part of appropriate conception of knowledge for judgments of theoretical reason - ask how go for theoretical physics and mathematics
- Harman argument - moral facts
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m facts need not figure in causal chain expls why make mj
expl j wrong ignite cat not require that fact-need only talk about sensibility, psychology, non-moral facts
no way mf affect perceptual app, nihilism (no fs) expl mf no role expl
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Harman - response - and cognitive psychology
- absence expl cog psy not point-being able give proof or state suff reasons for j is already best possible expl of beliefs of those who are reasonable and rational.
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Harman - outline
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Causal theory knowledge
problem with moral facts
Response - question theoretical
Response - not app practical
- Response to Harman - meet halfway - grant caus req prt of app concep obj for j theor reason
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caus r not essential all concep obj, not concp suit m and p ring-do not req rs for it show related app cau proc, or expl within cog psy
enough rs suff strong-expl j simply going grounds, expl lies rs sinc affirm-what more say except q sinc reason
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Noncognitivism - Background
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Naturalists and nonnat assume ethical terms refer properties and ethical statements are t or f
Look to use of mj and regard as disguied commands or exclam-surface form looks normal indic, invest use clues meaning
Job sent-expr emo, order, s
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Noncognitivism - the view
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function and meaning of ethical utterances best understood regard as commands, excl or some type other than those state facts
Denies ethical utt t or f in sense that corresp or fail to moral facts
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Emotivism - Ayer and Stevenson
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Atts conflict, some have do behavior others, many care about
Have ethical opinion is have att, norm expr mj-not subj, m dis about facts that may influence atti
Mag-mj att others-f in part affect
No state facts, or if do, secondary to
- Advantages of early emotivism - free talk of nonnatural properties, intuitions and rational insight
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OQA-one sort nat objec Firth-good met r not believe nonnat prop Mackie
Intuit-mj unverif-intu certin to one may not-unless poss provide criterion decide confl, appeal int bad as test of prop valid
Ayer-syn sign only if emp ver
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Advantage early emotivism - function language
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good ev m lang funct way emotive view-mag and expr att-espec if allow expr facts about speaker's at, just not prim role
Prob-expr quite different influencing action
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Advantage early emotivism - good evidence internalism - have ethical j essentially involves having ethical attitude
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Arg from disagree in ethics-why not agr in m akin to science-dis what expect, but can be explained of course
Em expl why moved do what think right-nonnatural more difficult-but does not show nec connection-facts human nature
Mj meant change
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Hare's revision of early emotivism
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abandon magnetism since less well supported
mj not expressions of personal attitudes but of impersonal or moral attitudes
- Hare's view - features - (1) prescribing
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mj viewed as species presc-done by commands, requests orders-tell us do rather than what is case-presc and desc different use and meaning, maybe same grammer
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Hare's view - Features - (2) universal prescriptions
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general mj dist class prescr-universal presc-apply any agent and act in relavant cs-wrong smoke applies everywhere, don't smoke here only in these cs
impl mj reflexive-apply speaker
rough-say x right, presc act and any rel similar act a
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Hare's view - features - (3) Expression, (4) Generality
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Expression-since giving presc includes acceptance, issuance m presc includes accp of it by speaker-so mj both directives and expr of one's acceptance for onself 'let me not smoke'
Gen-UP dir all people, no proper names rigged dd
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Problem with Hare
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What does prescrib amount to since mj do not issue orders, make requests or give commands
common element might be commending, but what is it to commend, other than express onself as being in favor of a certain thing
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Problems with emotivism - (1) features mj emotivism has no expl for
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think of them as true and false
regard mj as mistaken, not just different, not just like differences in attitude
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Emotivism - problems - (3) what is actually expressed
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if say emotions like indignation and horror, often make mj when no emotion like that
some attitude or incl but need think about whether these attitudes are always present
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Gibbard - background
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main concern with 'makes sense' or 'rational' do
noncog-being something makes sense do not property attributed action, rather meaning is explained by saying what state of mind her words express
- Problems with emotivism (2) - Frege Geach
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owed expl for meaning of mj when used in more complicated contexts-lying wrong is boo lying, so what is meaning in 'if lying is wrong then I will not lie'
interact in inf and arg-torment cat and brother-meaning conditional
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Gibbard's View
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say makes snese for agent do x is express one's accept system norms that, as applied to agent's c's, permits the thing
System norm-end result ways various gen norm ps person accepts combine and balance-develop ass all actions 'N-f
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Gibbard - system of norms
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System norm-end result ways various gen norm ps person accepts combine and balance-develop ass all actions 'N-for, opt, req'-by system
- Gibbard - objective and subjective rationality
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obj- advisable-what makes sense light all facts
subj-rat-makes sense available info
Think x rat is accept system subj app norms permit act, since being N-per is desc fact, thought comb norm state and fact belief
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Gibbard - embedded contexts - what state of mind being expressed?
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S stat with norm terms, WN norm fact world, W complete fact desc and N compl syst norms
S holds in WN, replace each norm pred in S with N corresp, yielding purely desc S'
S holds WN iff S' holds W
Content is set fact nor
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What objectivity is not
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valued all
universaliz
descriptivism-meaning purely descr-but concept different object
Plato-Forms eternal, extra mental realities
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Kant on objectivity
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to say objective is say it would be endorsed from a particular, reasonable standpoint